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In 1833, a time abounding with combative pamphlets, a particularly explicit 
declaration made its appearance: “This first writing by a woman is but a 
gauntlet thrown into the arena, yet in the author’s quiver remains more than 
one arrow for defending the truth of her first writing.”1 So reads the epigraph 
of a short brochure, published by its author and entitled Appel d’une femme au 
peuple sur l’affranchisement de la femme (Appeal of a woman of the people for 
the emancipation of woman). From what we know about the writer of this 
text and what remains of her work, she appears to be among those solitary 
figures whom Joan Wallach Scott has described as “neither typical . . . nor 
unique.”2 We find them where brothers- and sisters-in-arms are challenged 
not only by the content or the mode of thought, speech, and action of their 
work, but by a political subjectivity that does not allow itself to be seamlessly 
integrated into the unified subjectivity presupposed, and, thereby, produced 
by social movements. This is particularly true for feminism: the fundamental 
historical importance of a unified subjectivity for the development of femi-
nism was revealed most fully in the 1990s, when criticism of this unity led 
to what was perceived as a crisis of the movement.3
 Among some historians of feminism, Judith Butler’s call to “take the con-
struction of the subject as a political problematic” instead of presupposing 
this subject has become part of the program.4 I, too, am concerned with the 
reconstruction of a subject position that is not given but constituted by words, 
gestures, and acts. In this context, however, I am interested in a dimension 
that appears to me to have been insufficiently addressed in the history of 
subjectivity as well as in the history of feminism: temporality. While the Fou-
cauldian question of how forms of subjectivization have changed over time 
is, of course, at stake here, I would like to turn our attention to yet another 
aspect: the extent to which historically specific interpretations of temporal 
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situatedness operate in the constitution of subjectivity. In particular, I would 
like to consider how actors in nineteenth-century political movements derive 
their own subjectivity and that of others—as well as the truth claims related 
to those subjectivities—from their perception of temporal divergence, that 
is, from the perception of a differentiated being-in-time. As I will argue, 
historically specific temporal conceptions are operative here. That they mir-
ror our own historiographic conceptions of time may, perhaps, explain why 
this dimension has attracted so little historiographical attention.
Claire Démar
Little is known concerning the writer of the Appel. As an author, she is known 
as Claire Démar, but perhaps her name was Émilie d’Eymard. No image 
has survived, only a comrade’s description from 1833: thirty-two years old 
(perhaps thirty-three or thirty-four), she was small and brunette, with 
handsome hands and feet, her face tired-looking but pleasantly regular, her 
physiognomy and gaze proud, indeed somewhat hard, her speech brusque 
and halting. An excess of passion was perceptible, but little tenderness.5 It 
was conjectured that Démar belonged to the demi-monde before she ascended 
the barricades with the republicans during the July Revolution of 1830.6 Dis-
appointed, like many others, by the republicans’ careless treatment of the 
“woman question,” she turned shortly thereafter to the version of utopian 
socialism advanced by the Saint-Simonians who, from 1831 on—and with 
deep ambivalence—had vocally proclaimed the “liberation of women” a 
central tenet of their political program.7
 Démar’s published work is just as sparse as the surviving information 
about her life: in the very same year, 1833, in which the Appel appeared, she 
composed a more extensive text with the title Ma loi d’avenir (My law of the 
future). This would be Démar’s final work: by the time it appeared in 1834, 
she was dead. On August 8, 1833, she took her own life in a double suicide 
with the equally solitary Saint-Simonian Perret Desessarts.8 This brought 
to an end, at least for the moment, what the historian Christine Planté has 
interpreted as her “daring to speak”: a seizing of the word in the arena of 
political debate and the sketching of future social orders.9 “I respond,” Démar 
writes over and over again: “Me, woman, I will speak”; “I speak.”10
 In the following, I would like to argue that this event—by which I mean 
the double gesture of Démar composing her second text and committing 
suicide right after that—has to be understood as a deliberate coupling of 
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opposed times. While ending her life, and thus stating her finitude, Démar 
opens up a future for the collective she addresses in her writing. For within 
the context of her suicidal gesture, her text—My law of the future—reads as 
“my” law that belongs to a future in which “I” am not. The verité de l’auteur 
announced in the epigraph of Démar’s first text hence reveals itself through 
her specific way of being-in-time, or, more precisely, being-in-times: it can 
only be proclaimed as such by this author who is outlived by it. Démar’s act 
of coupling times thus reveals both a divergence from and a convergence of 
times. It sets her apart as the one who knows the future that others don’t. 
The others have to be taught to recognize the future in the present—to un-
derstand time differently.
 In what follows, I would like to elucidate this interpretation. I will try to 
show how Démar’s interpretation of political divergence in terms of diverg-
ing times brings forth her specific subject position as one that is able to let 
times converge. I will then address the conceptions of time that are set out in 
interpretations of Démar by her contemporaries and historians alike. With 
regard to this, I will speak of “anachronism” and “anachrony” as modes of 
interpretation of divergent times.11
Divergent Times and the Transitory  
Present of Utopia
The historian Alice Primi has recently noted that the experience of inequality 
in the nineteenth century was, for feminists, also an experience of differing 
times: “By measuring progress with reference to Fourier, according to the 
degree of liberty afforded women, they made visible a gender-differentiated 
temporality: on the one hand, the political achievements of men and the 
material innovations that were likewise created and enjoyed by men; on the 
other, the immobility—indeed even the regression—of the social status of 
women.”12 From this perspective, the unequal standing of women becomes 
a political anachronism, while human progress would mean the progressive 
accordance of women’s and men’s times.13
 An experience of differing times is also documented in Démar’s writing; 
indeed, she captures the exclusion of many of those governed from govern-
ing through the concept of a time divided within itself: “our century itself 
[is] certainly nothing other than a long paradox.”14 However, a decidedly 
republican—and, even more so, socialist-feminist—like Démar, who calls 
not only for the liberation of women, but for universal political participa-
110
tion and, additionally, for the abolition of property, sees the paradox of her 
century in a differentiated manner. Diverging temporality not only divides 
men and women but also divides men among themselves, since they too 
fall prey to what she calls the “fantasmagorie parlementaire” (parliamentary 
phantasmagoria), namely, the illusory character of political representation 
in the July Monarchy in France.15
 However, when it is a matter, not of political participation, but of the actual 
foundation of an entirely new society, which Démar locates in a new sexual 
morality, all find themselves in the same time—a transitory present. This 
shared social time overrides the divergence of times among groups insofar 
as the current sexual morality represses everyone indiscriminately. New mor-
als will not only achieve the liberation of women but automatically bring with 
them the liberation of those men who are still oppressed. Accordingly, Démar 
addresses major and minor contradictions as follows: “Indeed, the liberation 
of the proletarians, of the poorest and most numerous class, is only possible—I am 
convinced—through the liberation of our sex.”16 This claim of a common temporal 
space characterizes utopian thinking, which in the nineteenth century took 
the form of a sketch of the future of an entire society. Utopia was transformed 
from a “nonplace” into the “near or far future” of all, a future “towards which 
mankind inevitably approaches,” a program that strives to be realized “in every 
place” and encompasses the entire society.17 Or, as Walter Benjamin—modi-
fying a quotation from Jules Michelet—put it: “Every epoch, in fact, not only 
dreams the one to follow but, in dreaming, precipitates its awakening.”18
 If the future is thus interpreted programmatically as utopian, then the 
present necessarily appears as a time of transition. But this means that the 
present carries with it the two other times of the political imaginary of the 
nineteenth century.19 On the one hand, utopia’s present is filled with the 
expectation of the future. Already, Démar writes, “thrown into these times 
of destruction, of struggle, and of anarchy,” “we foresee” an “hour” that will 
come and “open a new era of social life,” that will bring an “order of better 
things.”20 On the other hand, the present appears as if buried by the past 
and so contains elements that are not worthy of having a future: “Where is 
the world going?” asked Suzanne Voilquin, the editor of Démar’s writings 
and herself a feminist Saint-Simonian: “What will it do with all the rubble 
of the past to which it is attached with so much force?”21
 As the point of intersection between an obsolete, but still lingering, past 
and an expected, but not yet initiated future (and, accordingly, as the point of 
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intersection between critique and imagination), utopian thought perceives 
the present as “historical”: it designates a point in time between a before 
and an after, and this temporal context bestows meaning upon it. Such a 
representation of the present fulfills the formal definition of the historical in 
terms of modern historiography as Georg Simmel has formulated it: namely, 
the convergence of chronological coordination with the interpretation based 
upon that coordination.22 But there is a contradiction in modern utopian 
thought’s conception of time since it is not history that gives value to the 
present of utopia; instead, its measure is that of a timeless “nature.” The 
utopias of the early social movements are not conceived of as the results of 
historical development, but as the realization of a potential that is always 
already present—in other words, as Voilquin formulated it, as the realiza-
tion of the “real demands of nature,” which have always been there.23 In 
Démar’s writings, too, it is an invariable but still unrecognized “nature” that 
organizes the perfect social order: namely, the law of fundamentally volatile 
and imponderable human feeling. I will return to this point.
 Hence, according to the many increasingly eschatologically oriented 
groupings of utopian socialists, a better society to come was rather a mat-
ter of sudden salvation than of a historical process. In Saint-Simonianism, 
it was the announced appearance of the idealized femme-messie, the female 
messiah, who—together with the actual leader of the movement, Prosper 
Enfantin, called “Père”—would lead humanity into the “new era.” As is well-
known, this theory of the femme-messie—and the mystical heightening of 
Saint-Simonian rhetoric linked to it—were accompanied by the increasing 
exclusion of women from the movement, to which women reacted by orga-
nizing themselves and, in particular, by founding their own journals.
Divergence/Convergence of Individual  
and Collective Time
Démar, too, believed in the femme-messie. “No, I do not doubt—I have never 
doubted—providence and its means, but I doubt us, poor women, who be-
lieve ourselves strong but—weak, timid, and Christian—will perhaps remain 
mute and insensible to the call of the REDEMPTRESS and would perhaps 
renounce her promise today because her actions would terrify us.”24 Démar 
addresses these lines to the authors of the Saint-Simonian women’s news-
paper Tribune des femmes, whom she reproaches for not going far enough in 
matters of sexual morality and love. But she thereby lays bare a fundamental 
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pitfall of the utopian expectation for the future which was caught up in the 
contradiction between a present perceived both in terms of historical pro-
cess and in terms of timelessness: if not even the women of the political 
avant-garde can recognize the entrance of the future in the present, because 
they stop before precisely that which is revolutionary, that is, always already 
there but not yet realized, who can? The point in time for which everyone 
waits, according to Démar’s bleak suspicion, will go unrecognized because 
it confronts the present with that which is radically new and therefore its 
“other”: “I say that we have to listen with respect and devotion, without the 
possibility of judgment or blame, every emancipatory speech that resounds, 
so strange, so unheard-of, I would say, even, be it as revolting as it may. —I 
go further,—I maintain that the speech of the REDEMPTRESS WILL BE A 
SUPREMELY REVOLTING SPEECH” (une parole souverainement révoltante).25
 In this passage, Démar deliberately teases out the double meaning of 
“révoltante”: it means at once “that which revolutionizes” (what her Saint-
Simonian readers long for) and also “that which disgusts” (what those living 
in the present reject). Here lies the challenge of revolution, for that which 
disgusts is not easily welcomed as the longed-for revolution it actually is.
 At first glance, Démar’s defense of revolution as being justified even as 
it—necessarily—disgusts her contemporaries could be read as a defense of 
her own design for a “new era” to which her audience responded with revolt 
and even revulsion. Indeed, Démar’s views were extreme, even within the 
context of the fundamentally transgressive political movements of the 1830s 
and 1840s; they were, as Planté writes, “extreme and singular.”26 The core 
of social revolution carried out by way of an upheaval in sexual mores lay, 
according to Démar, not only in the recognition of the absolute freedom of 
amorous feeling from all conventions and interests, something demanded 
by many utopian-socialist feminists. Of more importance, for Démar, was 
the recognition of the necessity of making a “test” (essai) of this feeling “in 
the material, in the flesh.”27
 Démar grounds this postulate in her own experience of failure using a 
tone of disturbing intimacy: “It is I who speak, who has rested voluntarily, 
only for an hour, in the arms of a man, and this hour erected a barrier of 
satiety between him and me, and this hour. . . was long enough to allow 
him to recede once again in my eyes into the monotone indifferent mass, 
and he once again became to me one of those entities who leave no trace in 
our lives other than a communal memory, cold and banal, without worth or 
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pleasure, without regret.”28 “Without regret” is decisive, for this is the point: 
the feeling sometimes does not stand up to bodily testing, but nevertheless, 
both emotional and corporeal engagement were justified.29
 Only in such an amorous praxis does Démar see human nature recognized 
as that which it is—volatile. From this she derives a right to secrecy in mat-
ters of love—which unmasks marriage as an obscene public declaration of 
amorous relations. The amorous secret culminates—Ma loi d’avenir moves 
towards its climax here—in the abolition of paternal filiation. And this is not 
enough, for the text concludes with a call to end maternal filiation as well, 
indeed even motherhood: “against the law of blood, the law of generation,” 
“no more paternity,” “no more maternity.”30
 These contours of a future era were in fact révoltantes. But it would be a mis-
take to take Démar’s defense of revolution’s revolting character to be nothing 
but a justification of her radical stance in matters of love and social organiza-
tion. Rather, what plays out in her argument about a present that is not able 
to recognize—and accept—the revolution is the immediacy of the experience 
of temporal divergence that motivates her attempt to combine finitude and 
future in the writing of Ma loi d’avenir and committing suicide. In Démar’s 
writings the “we” of those inhabiting the present and longing for a better 
future is never the one that can recognize this future. Whenever the future is 
envisaged and, indeed, the “revolting speech” is spoken, the “we” transforms 
itself into a solitary “I.” “I will speak, I who—alone, without the support, with-
out the encouragement, without the acclamation of any woman—already 
appealed to the people.”31 Hence, it is “my” law of the future that captures 
the new social order—and not: “the” law of the future. This “I” is alone in a 
present in which “the hour has not arrived, the world is not ready—and we 
shall fight for a long time to come in this pestilent atmosphere of the Christian 
moral law, which suffocates us; for a long time to come, our wishes, words, 
and deeds will collide with one another confusedly in the dark of this night, 
in this chaos of thought.”32 Within the shared time of a transitional utopian 
present, a divergence between the “I” and the “we” thus opens up.
 The temporal divergence that organizes Démar’s discourse separates the 
individual time of a woman who understands herself as avant-garde from 
the time of the collective to which she belongs. Both times co-occur in a 
transitory present constituted out of expectations for a future (which the “I” 
knows) and out of ruins of the past (in which the “we” lives). But both are 
different from one another in this present insofar as it bears the promise (as 
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expectation) but cannot realize it: “Where is it [the hour]?” writes Démar: 
“When will it come?” It is this divide between her personal and collective 
time which is expressed in Démar’s “moi seule” as a foundational moment of 
her subjectivity: she speaks and acts from this place of being-alone, tempo-
rally separated from the “we.”
 Démar overcomes this divide in the truth claim of her revolutionary being, 
which, on the one hand, is founded in the divergence between the “I” and 
the “we” but, on the other, is destined to close the gap. In death, she sublates 
the divergence of times (in a double sense: she abolishes and preserves it). 
Precisely as a gesture of finitude that sets an end to individual time, death 
is capable of leaving a lasting legacy to nonfinite collective time: as in a tes-
tamentary act, Démar seals the manuscript of Ma loi d’avenir and furnishes 
it with the decree that its contents should be read aloud at the next meeting 
of the Saint-Simonians and then handed to Prosper Enfantin.33 “There is 
something,” Démar writes in her farewell letter, “that is more important than 
individual wishes, private promises; we can neither deny nor misconstrue 
this other, stronger will.”34 In this subjective significance of social progress, 
that is, the need to instantiate revolution, the individual finitude of bio-
graphical time and the collective future of historical time coincide. Under the 
seal of the manuscript/death—that is, in the sacrifice of suicide that makes 
possible the speaking out and being heard of the “revolting speech”—the 
experience of temporal divergence is reconciled: by setting herself an end, 
Démar bequeaths her truth about the future to a collective that, as much as 
it is bound to the past, will continue to exist.35
 We may surmise that this gesture was understood, for it not only accords 
with the years of the Saint-Simonian utopie-spectacle, but also corresponds to 
the staging of the death of political figures in post-Revolutionary France.36 As 
Emmanuel Fureix has shown, this was celebrated as a political event and as the 
point of intersection of “collective experience” with the “horizon of expecta-
tion,” as a “passage” towards the “promise of a better tomorrow.”37 If, in the 
case of “great men,” burial festivities marked the passage to a better future, for 
Démar it was the reading of the manuscript, prescribed in her testament.
Anachronism, Anachrony, and Subjectivity
I have, in the case of Claire Démar, engaged in reflections on a specific ex-
perience of being-and-acting-in-time brought forth by an interpretation 
of subjectivity in temporal terms. In the final part of my essay, I would like 
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to counterpose my argument with historical interpretations of Démar and, 
in particular, with the concepts of “anachronism” and “anachrony” as two 
modes of interpreting divergent times and heterogeneous temporality.
 Historical interpretations of Démar commenced immediately after her 
death. Voilquin did not introduce the posthumous edition of Ma loi d’avenir 
with a foreword but with a “Notice historique.” In it, sources are cited (the 
farewell letters of Démar and Desessarts); the protagonist and the events are 
depicted and interpreted. As does Démar herself, Voilquin notes a difference 
between the “I” of the deceased, who had “no smile for our hope for the future 
and [could] see in FAITH nothing other than a kind of deceptive image, a fatal 
illusion,” and the “we” of her contemporaries who “must unite our endeavors 
and heighten our ardor, in order to work together for the realization of our 
new world.”38 Voilquin also adopts the interpretation of this divergence as 
temporal when she reads Démar’s writings as documents of “her thinking 
of the future” and Démar herself as a “passionate soul” who could not have 
been pleased by “this slow march” of a “reform” of small steps.39 Yet, this 
difference between the “I” and the “we” remains unreconciled for Voilquin 
and even leads to a banishing of Démar from her time: the present was too 
slow for Démar, or she was “too quick”—her suicide thus appears as a con-
firmation of her failure to exist in a way that accords with her time.
 This interpretation entered into historiography. In works on Saint-Simo-
nianism, one repeatedly finds the allusion to as well as the explicit statement 
that Démar killed herself “out of impatience.”40 The interpretation of the his-
torical phenomenon “Claire Démar” in the mode of a “too soon” operates in 
the manner of what Reinhart Koselleck calls “historico-temporal concepts” 
(geschichtszeitliche Begriffe): acceleration, delay, stagnation, regressions, the 
“too early” or the “too late,” the “not yet” and the “no longer.”41 These con-
ceptual terms—and thus interpretations of the past—are, according to Ko-
selleck, specifically modern. Unlike interpretations of the past, in terms of 
cosmological orders or plans of divine salvation, they explain that which 
has happened by locating it in time and temporal movements.
 Such a conception of the historical as oriented around movements in 
time (not necessarily conceived of as linear) may appear self-evident to 
the modern mind that engages scientifically with the past. But it is not: 
Siegfried Kracauer, for instance, considers it to be problematic whenever 
it organizes historical explanation per se—in other words, whenever his-
torical explanation is inferred on the basis of temporal sequences and thus 
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always already determined by the repertoire of historico-temporal concepts. 
That is precisely what happens in Voilquin’s “Notice historique” according 
to which Démar could not survive because she was an anticipation, that is, 
because she represented something that was still to come. From Kracauer’s 
perspective, such a historical explanation commits a category mistake by 
turning chronology into matter and form into content.42
 In the notion of the “too quick”—and of the “too early” reflected within 
it—it is, however, not only the historical phenomenon “Démar” that is in-
terpreted. In the claim that a person does not belong to a given time, the 
historical moment itself is homogenized and its contemporaries staged as 
a homogeneous temporal community. Furthermore, the construction of 
past temporal communities brings forth present ones, for only the closure 
of a past temporal space makes possible the determination of the present 
as differing from it. In the service of precisely such a necessity—not to in-
terpret the past but the present—Voilquin needed a Claire Démar who was 
untimely, who was “too quick”: in order to renew the hope—within a present 
that seemed to change only laboriously and not without regressions—it was 
precisely this slowness that was timely and a measure that things were going 
in their due course towards progress. To be a contemporary thus meant, for 
Voilquin, to “assimilate [my] words to progress as I found it in my environ-
ment.”43 Her being in accordance with her time authenticates her political 
stance, while her political stance, for its part, authenticates her time as being 
on track. In the same sense, Démar’s challenge to this time—as falling short 
of its revolutionary potential by not letting the future occur in the present—
can be neutralized by denying that she belongs to the very same time.
 Jacques Rancière has criticized such a homogenization of temporal 
space—or “epochs”—as the modus operandi of the “concept of anachro-
nism”: wherever someone or something is claimed to be anachronistic in 
the sense of “too early” or “too late,” it is presupposed that a temporal space 
displays a measure of homogeneity capable of defining persons and phe-
nomena as not belonging to it. Voilquin proceeds in this very way when 
she negates Démar’s contemporeanity. Rancière identifies this thinking in 
terms of homogeneous epochs as the expression of a specifically modern 
historiographical truth production: by stating that phenomena are not simply 
“not given” but are quasi-lawfully “impossible” whenever they do not accord 
with “their” epoch, the writing of history secures its scientificity. According 
to Rancière’s critique, in this nomothetical concept of the epoch, historical 
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thought is perverted: by operating according to the assumption of homo-
geneous epochs or of a “pure present,” it contains within itself the opposite 
of historicity. It cannot conceive of change.44 For Rancière, change is only 
possible when subjects act “against their time”—which means against the 
structures of their societies. He grasps such agency in terms of “anachrony”: 
“events, concepts, meanings acting against their time, which allow sense to 
circulate in a manner that escapes every cotemporality, every identity of a 
time with ‘itself.’”45
 While Voilquin perceived Démar as an “anachronism”—as not belonging 
to the present, as being too early for her epoch, too quick in moving through 
time—Démar herself sees her through the mode of “anachrony”: speaking 
the “revolting speech” she went necessarily against her time—to which she 
nevertheless belonged—because she fulfilled a timely necessity. By willing 
her thought of the future to the present through the sacrifice of suicide, she 
insisted upon the timeliness of her revolting being. It was precisely her revolt 
that, as something futural, was contemporary with a present that wished to 
overcome destruction and darkness. In this very copresence of divergent 
times, Démar constituted herself as a truth-speaking subject: there could 
only be a Claire Démar because she belonged to a time with which she did 
not correspond.
 “Anachronism” and “anachrony” were modes of constructing experience 
in temporal terms in a century so obsessed with the nexus of past, present, 
and future—this is what I have tried to show with these remarks. As a mar-
ginal note, but motivated by this argument, I would like to pose the question 
of whether it makes sense to use them as analytic categories of historical 
interpretation. Rancière has performed the corresponding critique in the 
case of “anachronism.” However, his alternative of “anachrony” remains 
bound to the very same idea of unified temporal spaces he criticizes, since 
a “counter-time” (ana-chrony) can only be spoken of when there is some-
thing that so dominates a temporal space that it is capable of defining this 
space. Thus “anachrony” breaks only half-heartedly with the concept of 
self-contained epochs, which are now more permeable but still determined 
in the mode of unity and deviation. Kracauer’s distinction between “formal,” 
or “measurable time” that alone defines a temporal space and the “bundles 
of shaped times in which the . . . series of events develops” seems to me at 
once more radical and more empirically open in its critique.46 In a given 
temporal space, events—each of which has its own temporality—could be 
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only formally simultaneous, but could at once, on this very ground, connect 
with one another—raising the always empirical question under what condi-
tions and in which constellations this occurs.
Conclusion
At the beginning of this article, I suggested that we should not only ask about 
epochal forms of subjectivation but also about whether and how historically 
specific interpretations of being-in-time enter into the formation of sub-
jectivity. In this regard, it seems to me particularly profitable to ask about 
the interpretation of copresent, but diverging, times in their significance 
for the constitution of the subject. The question can thus be posed whether, 
in Démar’s writing and acting, one temporal experience essential for the 
nineteenth century comes to expression: it could be that it is precisely the 
interpretation of the present through concepts of temporal divergence and the 
necessity of situating oneself with regard to them, as well as reacting to them, 
that found a heterogenous, temporal community of the nineteenth century. 
Claire Démar would then be a paradigmatic contemporary of the year 1833, 
for this would be the temporal space out of which her gestures (manuscript/
suicide) arose as an attempt to let the divergent temporalities of biographical 
finitude and social future come together through the legacy of Ma loi d’avenir. 
Which different subjectivities were produced within this historical context 
would remain an open question. But this also demands a metahistorical 
reflection upon our own historiographical conceptions of time—which, ad-
mittedly, is not more than an all-too-often forgotten triviality.
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